Rare earth elements (REEs) are essential to modern technologies ranging from cellphones to missiles; yet America depends on China for most of its consumption of REEs.
While the Defense Department currently has access to rare earths such as neodymium through its suppliers, they don't possess strong domestic processing capacities yet - something which could change soon.
Rare earth elements are an indispensable component of many modern technologies, from smartphones and hybrid cars to hybrid motors and the electric motors powering them. Unfortunately, China has long held onto nearly 100% of the global rare earth market; as a result, most countries around the globe, including the U.S., rely heavily on Beijing to supply these essential resources.
Rare-earth metal products require mining rare-earth metals, separating and refining them through an intensive and intricate process, and then refining further. Processing a single ton of rare-earth oxides takes three years; all usable forms come from China.
As such, the Defense Department is forced to develop a strategy for acquiring critical metals. But its solution must go beyond Pentagon confines - it should encompass the commercial markets for rare-earth oxides and metals.
At present, there are some potential sources for rare-earth metals in the environment. Water that drains from mines contains rare-earth elements, and scientists are working on methods for extracting them from this contaminated water. Phosphogypsum waste from producing phosphate fertilizers also contains rare earths and could serve as another source for these metals.
No matter their feasibility, it is clear that DOD needs a more robust plan for ensuring its supply chain security. One effective method of doing this would be establishing criticality and assessing risks to its supply chains - that's why I welcome legislation proposed by Reps. Mike Coffman and Doug Lamborn that would remove regulatory roadblocks for mining while simultaneously mandating that the Department of Interior review potential new resources within U.S. borders while setting national policy goals related to rare earths.
Few Americans can name any of the 17 rare earth elements, yet these metals play key roles in everything from cell phones and flat-screen monitors to laser weapons. Their low supply means their prices reflect this reality.
China controls nearly 90 percent of global rare earths through territorial control or exclusive mining rights, and has used them as leverage in international political trade negotiations. For instance, in 2010 when tensions flared over Japan's claim over Senkaku Islands, China restricted rare earth exports. Though the market soon stabilized again quickly after such disruptions had subsided, an extended disruption could severely impact defense programs.
Australia and Japan both possess large material deposits for rare earths production, as well as expertise in processing and refining them, so partnering between those nations would enable each to benefit from economies of scale as well as demand from other markets while still protecting vital national security interests.
The Department of Defense currently depends on outside sources for its rare earths needs, although Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working on domestic access issues through defense appropriations bills. An interim solution would be adding these critical materials directly into DOD stockpile, but that requires additional approvals by Congress each time.
Rare Earth Elements-including Lanthanides, Scandium and Yttrium-are an indispensable component of modern technology. Their fluorescent, magnetic and conductive properties make them suitable for producing permanent magnets, catalysts and rechargeable batteries. Their components can be found everywhere from smartphones and consumer electronics devices to advanced weapons systems and renewable energy technology like wind turbines or electric vehicles.
China has successfully taken control of the rare-earth market through leveraging cheap labor, loose environmental standards and government policies that promote production, according to Dean Cheng of Heritage Institute. According to him, 80 percent of US rare-earth consumption now comes from Chinese suppliers, according to him.
As demand for these metals increases, it will be essential to secure domestic supplies of them, said Linton. This could be achieved using mining and processing technologies developed by Lynas which plans on opening a refinery in Malaysia; Lynas' waste will conform with Malaysian and U.S. environmental standards while not producing toxic sludge like what many Chinese plants produce.
According to the U.S. Geological Survey, "rare-earth" metals refer more to unfamiliarity than scarcity; in fact, these metals are abundant across ores around the globe, and even rarer ones such as thulium and lutetium are 200 times more abundant than gold.
As our economy and technology advance, rare earth metals become ever more essential. From cellphones to automobile engines and fiber optic cable to military laser targeting systems - rare earths play an integral role. Each F-35 Lightning II aircraft requires approximately 920 pounds of rare earth elements such as yttrium and terbium for operation.
The United States relies on China for up to 80 percent of its rare-earth consumption, leaving them susceptible to geopolitical disruptions. Though global commercial markets have historically weathered geopolitical storms relatively well, their resilience may no longer exist today; investing in rare-earth production by government can provide supply security that strengthens national security.
Unfortunately, the Department of Defense (DOD) lacks a comprehensive strategy for identifying and mitigating risks to its critical material needs. Although three of DOD's offices have identified rare-earth minerals as vitally important to national security purposes, each office uses different definitions and methodologies when identifying "critical" minerals - making coordination between organizations difficult.
Defense Logistics Agency-Strategic Materials office relies on stockpiling as an adequate means of mitigating risks; this approach cannot properly address shortfalls that would occur from disruptions caused by China, which controls both prices and supply for rare materials worldwide.